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Objective To apply human factors engineering principles
to improve alert interface design. We hypothesized that
incorporating human factors principles into alerts would
improve usability, reduce workload for prescribers, and
reduce prescribing errors.
Materials and methods We performed a scenario-
based simulation study using a counterbalanced, crossover
design with 20 Veterans Affairs prescribers to compare
original versus redesigned alerts. We redesigned drug–
allergy, drug–drug interaction, and drug–disease alerts
based upon human factors principles. We assessed usability
(learnability of redesign, efﬁciency, satisfaction, and usability
errors), perceived workload, and prescribing errors.
Results Although prescribers received no training on the
design changes, prescribers were able to resolve redesigned
alerts more efﬁciently (median (IQR): 56 (47) s) compared
to the original alerts (85 (71) s; p=0.015). In addition,
prescribers rated redesigned alerts signiﬁcantly higher than
original alerts across several dimensions of satisfaction.
Redesigned alerts led to a modest but signiﬁcant reduction
in workload (p=0.042) and signiﬁcantly reduced the
number of prescribing errors per prescriber (median (range):
2 (1–5) compared to original alerts: 4 (1–7); p=0.024).
Discussion Aspects of the redesigned alerts that likely
contributed to better prescribing include design
modiﬁcations that reduced usability-related errors, providing
clinical data closer to the point of decision, and displaying
alert text in a tabular format. Displaying alert text in a
tabular format may help prescribers extract information
quickly and thereby increase responsiveness to alerts.
Conclusions This simulation study provides evidence that
applying human factors design principles to medication
alerts can improve usability and prescribing outcomes.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Computerized medication alerts can reduce medica-
tion errors, but there are still challenges to fully
realize their beneﬁts.1 2 Seidling et al3 found that
alert acceptance was most strongly predicted by the
quality of the alert interface display. However,
‘serious gaps’1 remain in understanding how to
effectively display alert information to prescri-
bers.1 2 4 5 To this end, Horsky et al6 outlined inter-
face design principles for prescribing decision
support, but derived principles from implementation
reports because of a lack of studies on interface
design. Recognizing that alerts are a type of warning,
Phansalkar et al7 summarized human factors
guidelines for hazard signs and warning labels to
inform the design of medication alerts. Four content
components are recommended for text-based warn-
ings: (1) a signal word to capture attention and
convey the probability and severity of injury; (2)
hazard information that identiﬁes the danger; (3)
instructions to avoid the hazard; and (4) information
on potential consequences if the hazard is not
averted.8 One human factors handbook on warnings
presents over 800 pages of evidence-based research
ﬁndings and standards for warning design across
various industries.9 Many principles apply to the
medication alert interface but have not been consist-
ently implemented.7
A few studies have modiﬁed and compared the
interface design features of alerts; most of these
have focused on alert intrusiveness,10–13 which gen-
erally refers to the extent to which alerts interrupt
prescribers’ work or require acknowledgment.14
One simulation study compared modal alerts against
non-modal alerts, as well as no alert. A modal
design forces the prescriber to interact with the alert
before interacting with other components of the
interface, whereas a non-modal alert does not. Both
alert types were associated with reduced prescribing
error rates compared to no alerts, but the error rate
for non-modal alerts was 3.6 times higher than that
for modal alerts.11 Similarly, two randomized con-
trolled trials of laboratory monitoring alerts showed
that non-modal alerts did not signiﬁcantly improve
laboratory test ordering compared to no alert.12 13
From the communication-human information
processing (C-HIP) model in the human factors lit-
erature, one can deduce that alerts are more likely to
capture prescribers’ attention and be effective if the
alert is more intrusive. This model15 posits that for a
warning (eg, alert) to be effective, it must ﬁrst
capture the attention of the intended recipient, a
step called ‘attention switch.’16 While intrusiveness
is desirable for attention switch, one investigation
found that a drug interaction alert—which could
not be easily overridden—led to unintended conse-
quences of delayed treatment.4 This illustrates the
challenge of designing effective and safe alerts. In
addition to intrusiveness, the layout, text format,
and interface display of alerts likely inﬂuence alert
effectiveness and medication safety.3 7 14 17 We
found no studies that incorporated human factors
principles into medication alerts and evaluated the
impact of the resulting design changes. Our
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objective was to do this in a simulation environment with prescri-
bers. We hypothesized that applying human factors principles to
the design of the medication alert interface would improve
usability, reduce prescribers’ workload, and reduce prescribing
errors.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Organizational setting and details of the alert system
A simulation study was conducted at the Veterans Affairs (VA)
Health Services Research and Development (HSR&D)
Human-Computer Interaction and Simulation Laboratory in a
VA medical center (VAMC).18 The original alert interface in this
study (ﬁgure 1) mirrors the VA alert system used for patient
care. The VA system incorporates clinical information from VA
or First DataBank, depending on the type of alert, and is imple-
mented at over 150 VAMCs and 1400 clinics.14 19 This study
focused on drug–allergy, drug–drug interaction, and drug–
disease alerts, since these alerts represent different design chal-
lenges, commonly occur during prescribing, and are important
for patient safety. In this article, ‘alert dialog box’ refers to the
pop-up box presented to prescribers, and ‘alerts’ refers to one
or more associated warning messages within the box. This
article was prepared according to STARE-HI guidelines.20
Alert redesigns
Redesigned features (table 1) were selected based upon available
evidence as well as ﬁeld observations and interviews with pre-
scribers.14 The design team was guided by two human factors
engineers and consisted of physicians, pharmacists, a nurse prac-
titioner, and informatics experts. The team iteratively redesigned
alerts using paper-based prototyping over 8 months. Redesigns
were shared with an advisory panel of national VA informatics
and medication safety leaders for additional input. Alerts were
redesigned (ﬁgure 2) to appear in one alert dialog box at a
single time point, immediately after the prescriber entered pre-
scription information. A limited-function, high-ﬁdelity mockup
of the VA’s electronic health record (EHR) system was created,
which was not integrated into patient care, to safely evaluate the
alert designs. For this study, we created two copies of the same
mock EHR system, one with the original alerts designs and one
with the redesigned alerts.
Scenario development
Three standardized patient scenarios were constructed over
12 months (see online supplementary ﬁle, appendix I).
Scenarios were identical across the two alert designs, except for
the patient’s name, and were clinically relevant for outpatient
primary care. Altogether, scenarios included 19 possible alerts:
5 drug–allergy, 11 drug–drug interactions, and 3 drug–disease
alerts for creatinine clearance. We included alerts that were
likely to be familiar to prescribers as well as alerts that were
likely to be unfamiliar. Some alert dialog boxes contained mul-
tiple alerts. Pharmacological information was veriﬁed by con-
sulting Micromedex.21
We deliberately developed scenarios where correct and incor-
rect responses to alerts could be clearly deﬁned, enabling us to
evaluate how the alert design inﬂuenced prescribing errors.
Correct actions encompassed a range of anticipated responses:
changing the medication, changing the dose, canceling a new
medication order, discontinuing a current medication, and
Figure 1 Screen shots of the original
alert dialog boxes. The screen shots
are from our mock-up of the Veterans
Affairs (VA) alert system and are nearly
identical to the alerts actually used in
clinical care. (A) A drug–disease alert
for creatinine clearance. This alert only
appears when the prescriber initiates
the prescribing process but before the
prescriber has selected a speciﬁc
medication. (B) Drug–allergy and
drug–drug interaction alerts triggered
by an ibuprofen order. This alert dialog
box appears immediately after a
prescriber enters information for the
prescription, and is formally known as
an ‘acceptance order check.’ (C) The
session alert dialog box, which
appears when the prescriber attempts
to sign the order and is intended to
help coordinate care across prescribers
(eg, medical students who initiate the
order, and physicians who sign it). If
one or more alert(s) in ﬁgure 1B are
bypassed earlier during the ordering
session, then the ordering process
continues and the overridden alerts
appear again in this session alert
dialog box. In addition, when two new
medications that interact with each
other are ordered, the drug–drug
interaction alert is only displayed via
this session alert. This session alert is
formally known as the ‘session order
check.’
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overriding the alert. A pharmacist and physician from the
research team reviewed the scenarios and outlined a pre-deﬁned
list of correct and incorrect actions for each task. Scenarios were
further reﬁned based on pilot tests with three prescribers who
were not included in the main study.
Study design
A scenario-based simulation study was conducted with prescri-
bers using a counterbalanced, crossover design for a within-
subject, repeated measures (two sessions: time 1 and time 2)
comparison of original versus redesigned alerts. Each prescriber
completed two 30 min sessions. In the ﬁrst session, half of the
prescribers received the original alerts and half received the
redesigned alerts. Three scenarios were presented in the same
order during both sessions. A washout period (2 weeks
minimum) was used for each prescriber to reduce the likelihood
that they would remember the scenario and previous responses
to alerts.
Table 1 Summary of key changes to alert design
Redesign decision Human factors principle(s) Rationale or example
A. Alerts presented in a tabular format Chunking23 Grouping information can reduce cognitive effort.
B. Similar information is presented in the same column
(ie, see first and second columns of figure 2) with
consistent tabs and spacing
Proximity compatibility principle24 25 For the second column in figure 2, ‘symptoms’ was used for the
adverse reaction alerts only since, unlike the other alerts, this refers
to the patient’s medical history. Previous design iterations listed
‘severity’ in the second column for drug interactions, but the order
of this column was changed so that ‘risk’ information was
presented in the same location as for the other alert types.
C. Order of alert types within one alert dialog box; if
alerts related to any of the following categories, then they
were always presented in this order:
▸ Adverse reaction
▸ Drug–drug interactions
▸ Low creatinine clearance
Visual alerts should be located in the
visual field in order of importance7
We used a similar order as the original alert design, but
intentionally placed alerts about low creatinine clearance last
(figure 2). Since the actual severity of an individual warning
message can depend on patient-related variables, we assigned an
order based on the alert type (adverse reaction, drug–drug
interaction, or creatinine clearance) and the general propensity of
that alert type to result in an adverse drug event. A standardized
order of alert types was decided based upon:
1. Type of risk to the patient, with most severe appearing first
2. Potential for immediate harm, with an allergic response being
the most immediate.
D. Medication name added to alert header Situation awareness26 Header indicates what drug is being ordered to help prescribers
accurately perceive and understand the prescribing task in the event
of disruptions. (An example header is shown in figure 2, ‘ordering
ibuprofen tab.’)
E. Use of signal words:
▸ Adverse reaction
▸ Interactions
▸ Low creatinine clearance
Warning design guidelines recommend
including a signal word that conveys level
or degree of hazard7 16
The American National Standards Institute broadly recommends
‘DANGER,’ ‘WARNING,’ and ‘CAUTION’ for industrial hazards.16 We
considered these terms but ultimately decided against them
because:
1. The level of danger associated with an individual alert often
depends on patient-related variables that the computer system
can neither account for nor detect; thus, these terms may
frequently be inaccurate or misleading for a given alert
2. Concerns that use of these terms would decrease prescribers’
ability to quickly distinguish between various types of
medication hazards and alerts
3. The selected terms were believed to be more clinically
meaningful, more closely match end-users’ terms, and provide
basic information on type of hazard.
F. Scrolling eliminated Function allocation27 and hazard control
hierarchy8 28
With the original alerts, there is a risk that warning messages may
be hidden beneath the visual field because the design includes a
scrolling mechanism. In this case, manipulating the viewing area is
more appropriately allocated to the computer rather than the
person. The redesign eliminates the need to scroll; instead, the alert
dialog box expands to present text. Thus, we ‘designed out’ the risk
of alerts remaining hidden beneath the viewing area. Designing out
the risk is a strong approach for hazard control.
G. Links to additional information embedded within
individual alerts
Proximity compatibility principle24 25 and
principle of consistency29
Related information should be shown together on interface displays.
The coloring and style of links used were intended to be similar to
those used in other applications (eg, web sites) and thus aligned
with end-users’ expectations for hyperlinks.
H. Action buttons separated by greater distance, with
‘Cancel’ still on the right
Hazard control hierarchy8 28 Added space between action buttons ‘Accept order’ and ‘Cancel
order’ in an attempt to safeguard against accidental clicks of an
unintended action. Safeguards generally provide moderate hazard
control.
We applied human factors principles to alert interface design, relying heavily on established warning design guidelines9 15 and Nielsen’s principles for interface design.22
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Prescriber selection and recruitment
All VAMC outpatient prescribers, including physicians, nurse
practitioners, and clinical pharmacists who worked in primary
care and had at least 1 year of VA computerized provider order
entry (CPOE) experience were invited to participate. Students
and residents were excluded from the study.
Simulation procedure
One researcher facilitated all sessions and read a standardized,
scripted introduction to each prescriber. Prescribers were
informed that the goal was to compare two different alert
designs; they did not receive any training on the alert designs as
part of the simulation procedure. Prescribers were asked to com-
plete scenarios as though the patients were real and were
informed that no medication orders would be sent to any phar-
macy or patient. A physical barrier separated the facilitator from
prescribers to reduce the potential for bias related to the facilita-
tor’s proximity. Prescribers did not have access to reference
materials. The facilitator refrained from offering guidance
unless the prescriber experienced a technical difﬁculty or was
unable to proceed without assistance.
Prescribers completed tasks in the same sequence. Clinical
information, such as patient’s age, diagnoses, laboratory results,
and medication lists, was provided on an introductory sheet and
in the mock EHR system. Prescribers were asked to complete
each of the ﬁrst two scenarios within 7 min and the researcher
gave verbal warnings when 3 and 1 min remained, to simulate
the time pressure in a primary care environment. If prescribers
exceeded the time limit, they were asked to complete the tasks;
thus, prescribing errors were not due to prematurely stopping
the scenario. For the ﬁrst two scenarios, prescribers were asked
to ‘think aloud’30 by verbalizing their thought process as well as
positive and negative reactions to alerts. If prescribers remained
quiet when encountering an alert, the researcher reminded them
to think aloud. The evidence is mixed on whether verbalizations
may inappropriately slow or speed time measurements.31
Therefore, taking a conservative approach, we asked prescribers
to refrain from the think aloud protocol for the third scenario,
where we measured efﬁciency. Since prescribers had at least
1 year of experience with the original alert design (modeled
after the VA alert system), but none with the redesigned alerts,
the third scenario was selected to more accurately compare efﬁ-
ciency across the two alert designs by mitigating potential learn-
ing effects. We did not specify a time limit for the third
scenario.
Data collection and outcome measures
Usability
Video data were recorded via a webcam and Morae software to
capture prescribers’ verbal and non-verbal behavior along with
computer screen, keyboard, and mouse activities.18 We assessed
four usability attributes that are widely accepted32: (1) learnabil-
ity: how easy is it for end-users to accomplish fundamental tasks
the ﬁrst time they encounter the design? (2) efﬁciency: after
learning the technology, how quickly can end-users complete
tasks? (3) satisfaction: how well do end-users like using the
design? and (4) usability errors: does the technology support a
low error rate so that few usability issues/critical errors occur
while the end-user is using the technology?32 33
Learnability and usability errors were evaluated by reviewing
video recordings. Efﬁciency was measured from time-stamped
video recordings from the third scenario via: (1) scenario com-
pletion time, measured from the appearance of the ﬁrst alert
dialog box until the disappearance of the last alert dialog box;
and (2) time spent on alerts, measured by adding the time spent
on each alert dialog box that occurred during the scenario.
Time was measured from the appearance to the disappearance
of each alert dialog box and included any repeat alerts.
Satisfaction was measured via the validated, 19-item Computer
System Usability Questionnaire (CSUQ),34 which prescribers
were asked to complete after ﬁnishing all scenarios. Debrief
interviews were conducted as time permitted.
Perceived workload
Workload was measured after each scenario when prescribers
completed an electronic tool based on the validated, paper-
based NASA Task Load Index (NASA TLX) instrument.35 The
NASA TLX measures perceived mental workload across six sub-
scales: mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand,
performance, effort, and frustration. It also yields a global
workload score. Higher scores indicate higher perceived
workload.
Prescribing errors
To assess prescribing errors, one pharmacist reviewed each video
and categorized responses to alerts against the team’s predeﬁned
list of correct and incorrect actions. A second pharmacist double-
checked these categorizations against the predeﬁned criteria. If
the correct categorization was unclear, a third team member was
consulted.36 For example, this included cases where a prescriber
did not receive an alert due to a technical issue and instances
where a prescriber vocalized intent to respond to an alert but did
not complete the action. We followed the predeﬁned criteria
throughout the analysis. Prescribing errors included errors of
Figure 2 Screen shots of the
redesigned alerts. The task that could
lead to the alert shown read, ‘[The
patient] has chronic pain due to
osteoarthritis and has been managing
it with ibuprofen since 2006. [The
patient] asks you for a new
prescription for his ibuprofen since he
is about out and has no more reﬁlls.
Begin renewing ibuprofen.’
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omission (no prescription) and errors of commission (inappropri-
ate prescriptions). In other words, if a prescriber took action
based upon an inappropriate alert, or did not take action in
response to a valid alert, both situations were counted as a pre-
scribing error. Since multiple alerts can be presented in the same
alert dialog box, a maximum of 11 prescribing errors were pos-
sible per session.
Data analyses
Summed responses to CSUQ subscales were each analyzed with
a paired t test with a Sidak multiple comparison adjustment to
control the overall conﬁdence at 95% using SAS V.9.2 (Cary,
North Carolina, USA). As outcomes for efﬁciency and prescrib-
ing errors were not normally distributed, the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test was performed using SPSS V.20 (IBM). All of
these analyses account for within-subject, repeated measures
(time 1 and time 2). CSUQ, efﬁciency, and prescribing errors
were analyzed irrespective of the order of alert design since this
was a counterbalanced study with a 2-week washout period to
mitigate potential learning effects from time 1 to time 2.
For the NASA TLX analysis, we used raw TLX scores,37 38
since the weighting procedure has been shown to have limited
beneﬁt.39 40 NASA TLX scores for workload were analyzed
using repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA).41 42 The
linear mixed effects model included ﬁxed effects for scenario
(1, 2, 3), alert design (original, redesign), presentation order
(redesign ﬁrst, original ﬁrst), subscale (each of the six described
in the ‘Perceived workload’ subsection), and the interaction
between alert design and subscale. The model also included a
random effect for prescriber to account for the correlation
between measurements from the same prescriber (ie, clustered
data). The intra-provider agreement for NASA TLX was assessed
using intra-class correlation coefﬁcients.43 This determines the
proportion of total variability due to variability between prescri-
bers. Comparisons were made between designs for each subscale
and p values were adjusted using the Sidak multiple comparison
method. NASA TLX analysis was completed using SAS V.9.2.
For all analyses, a statistically signiﬁcant difference existed for
p values <0.05; where data were not normally distributed,
median values are presented instead of means.
RESULTS
Prescribers’ characteristics
Twenty prescribers (six men and 14 women; 43% response rate)
from ﬁve different primary care clinics completed the study.
Prescribers included 14 physicians, two nurse practitioners, and
four clinical pharmacists. The mean duration of experience with
the VA CPOE system was 7.5 years (range: 1–13.5 years). The
mean age of prescribers was 41 years (range: 29–56 years).
Sessions were conducted between October 2011 and March
2012.
Usability attributes
1. Learnability of redesigned alerts. In general, prescribers were
able to respond to the redesigned alerts without training or
guidance. Three prescribers, however, had difﬁculty overrid-
ing the ﬁrst redesigned alert that they encountered and
required prompting from the facilitator to proceed past the
alert dialog box (see also: 4. Usability errors). One prescriber
experienced this again when encountering a second alert but
was then able to override the redesigned alerts thereafter.
2. Efﬁciency. Prescribers completed tasks more quickly with the
redesigned alerts (median (IQR): 195 (54) s vs original
alerts: 246 (108) s; p=0.010). Similarly, prescribers spent
signiﬁcantly less time on redesigned alerts (56 (47) s vs ori-
ginal alerts: 85 (71) s; p=0.015).
3. Satisfaction. Overall, prescribers were more satisﬁed with the
usability of the redesigned alerts compared to the original
alerts (table 2).
4. Usability errors. The redesign reduced or eliminated some
types of errors (table 3) but also introduced new usability
errors (table 4).
Perceived workload
Based on the statistical model, there was a signiﬁcant difference
in the NASA TLX global workload score between the two alert
designs (mean±SEM for original design: 38.6±5.5; redesign:
36.0±5.0; p=0.042). However, there was no signiﬁcant differ-
ence between the original and redesigned alerts for any individ-
ual subscale (ﬁgure 3). The intra-class correlation coefﬁcient
was estimated to be 0.389 and represents the fraction of vari-
ability in the NASA TLX that is due to variability between pre-
scribers. See online supplementary ﬁle, appendix II for detailed
ﬁndings.
Prescribing errors
Compared to the original alerts, the redesigned alerts signiﬁ-
cantly reduced prescribing errors. The median (range) per pre-
scriber across all scenarios was 4 (1–7) errors with the original
alerts and 2 (1–5) errors with the redesigned alerts (p=0.024);
a maximum of 11 errors were possible per prescriber. For this
prescribing error analysis, N=18 prescribers, since two prescri-
bers did not receive one of the alerts due to technical difﬁcul-
ties. Figure 4A–C shows the distribution of error frequency
across prescribers, across patient scenarios, and by error type
(omission vs commission), respectively. With the original alerts,
60% of prescribers made four or more errors, but with the rede-
signed alerts, 61% of prescribers made only one or two errors
(ﬁgure 4A). Most of the original alerts are displayed twice
(ﬁgure 1B,C), while each redesigned alert was presented once.
Thus, we examined whether showing the original alerts a
second time substantially changed prescribing actions. In
response to the second appearance of an alert, four (20%) pre-
scribers canceled a medication, switching to a correct action;
however, three (15%) prescribers stopped a medication order,
switching to an incorrect action.
DISCUSSION
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst scenario-based simulation to
systematically apply human factors principles to medication alert
design and examine the effect on usability, prescribers’
Table 2 Satisfaction scores from the Computer System Usability






Overall satisfaction (items 1–19) 4.3 (0.3) 5.2 (0.3) 0.033
System usefulness (items 1–8) 4.5 (0.3) 5.2 (0.3) 0.372*
Information quality (items 9–15) 4.2 (0.3) 5.2 (0.3) 0.039*
Interface quality (items 16–18) 4.3 (0.3) 5.2 (0.3) 0.013*
Ratings are derived from 7-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1=strongly disagree to
7=strongly agree. Results are shown as mean (SEM). Statistically significant findings are
shown in bold.
*p Values from paired t test adjusted using the Sidak method to control the overall
confidence at 95%.
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workload, and prescribing errors. Our hypotheses were sup-
ported by study results: overall, incorporating human factors
principles into the interface design of medication alerts: (1)
improved usability for prescribers; (2) reduced perceived work-
load; and (3) reduced prescribing errors.
Usability
Redesigned alerts supported usability attributes by fostering
learnability, reducing some usability errors, increasing prescri-
bers’ satisfaction ratings for alerts, and increasing prescribing
efﬁciency. Overall, prescribers were able to learn how to use the
redesigned alerts on their own, and design changes reduced crit-
ical usability errors. Findings that prescribers sometimes can-
celed a medication when they thought they were ordering it—
or vice versa depending on the alert design (tables 3 and 4)—
have not been previously reported for medication alerts. For the
redesign (table 1, row H), the ‘cancel order’ button may have
been inadvertently selected as a way to proceed, since buttons
on the lower right of a screen display are often used for ‘next’
on other software interfaces, rather than stop or ‘cancel’ as
shown in ﬁgure 2, but we cannot conﬁrm this interpretation.
Prescribing efﬁciency increased with the redesigned alerts,
even though prescribers had experience with the original alerts
but received no training on design modiﬁcations. Efﬁciency data
demonstrate that time savings were due to redesigned alerts,
rather than other parts of the ordering process. Improved efﬁ-
ciency was likely the result of: (1) modifying the design to
present each alert only once, which reduced the number of
alerts and alert dialog boxes; and (2) displaying information in a
tabular format. Only the original alerts presented creatinine
clearance alerts separately (see ﬁgure 1 and 2), but this does not
explain the differences in efﬁciency since there were no creatin-
ine clearance alerts during the third scenario where efﬁciency
was measured. Both good and poor alert designs have the
potential to shorten the time spent on warnings44: a good
design may provide better cognitive support and help prescri-
bers extract information quickly, while a poor design may cause
prescribers to prematurely dismiss alerts.44 Thus, time data need
to be interpreted in light of other ﬁndings: redesigned alerts
Table 3 Summary of usability errors that were reduced or eliminated with the redesigned alerts
Original alerts Redesigned alerts
Design feature Associated usability errors Redesign feature Associated usability errors Potential safety implications
Prescribers are expected to use a
scrolling mechanism when the alert
text exceeds the visual field.
19 medication alerts* were missed
across 6 (30%) prescribers because
alerts were hidden by a scrolling
mechanism. Two were clinically
appropriate alerts for ‘critical’ drug
interactions that remained
unnoticed during prescribing.
The scrolling mechanism was
eliminated. Instead, the alert
dialog box resizes itself to
accommodate the amount of
alert text.
None Alerts, including critical alerts, may
be inadvertently missed by
prescribers when using an alert
interface with a scrolling
mechanism. A design that
eliminates the need to scroll
eliminates the risk of alerts that are
hidden below the visual field.
‘Cancel’ checkbox can be selected
on the session alert to cancel
medication orders (figure 1C).
Two (10%) prescribers interpreted
the checkbox as a way to denote
what medications were being
ordered with a corresponding
override justification.
The ‘Cancel’ checkbox design
was eliminated.
None, but one limitation of the
redesign was that only the
medication order being
processed could be changed
directly from an alert.
With the checkbox design in figure
1C, there is a risk that some
medications may be unintentionally
cancelled.
To cancel a medication from the
session alert (figure 1C), the
prescriber must select ‘Cancel’ and
then click ‘Cancel Checked Order(s).’
12 (60%) of prescribers vocalized
an intent to cancel or discontinue
the medication, but did not click
the ‘Cancel Checked Order(s)’
button; thus, they did not complete





None The canceling process in figure 1C
does not adequately prevent
usability errors.† At a minimum,
many prescribers are likely to
encounter error boxes that disrupt
prescriber workflow.
Most alerts that appear at an earlier
stage of the ordering process are
shown a second time in the session
alert (see figure 1B vs C).
Five (25%) prescribers expressed
confusion or frustration that the
session alert dialog box repeated
alerts that appeared earlier in the
ordering process.
Session alert removed. Each
alert was presented only
once.
None, but for the VA system,
other design modifications
would be needed to coordinate
care across prescribers and
account for unsigned
medications.
Repeated alerts within the same
ordering session cause confusion for
some prescribers and may promote
alert fatigue.
Medications that are in the process
of being discontinued in response to
an alert still trigger alerts later in
the ordering process (figure 1C
stage) since the discontinuation has
not yet been signed.‡
Five (25%) prescribers expressed
confusion when this alert dialog
box (figure 1C) included alerts for
medications that were in the
process of being discontinued.
Many of these prescribers
expressed uncertainty about what
would happen if they selected the
‘Cancel’ check box for these
medications.
If a prescriber starts to
discontinue a medication,
this does not trigger alerts.
None Alerts triggered by medications
being discontinued cause confusion
for prescribers and may promote
alert fatigue.
The results presented are applicable across multiple types of alerts (eg, drug–drug interactions, etc).
*Alerts included drug–drug interactions for simvastatin/amiodarone, simvastatin/diltiazem, warfarin/ciprofloxacin, phenelzine/fluoxetine, and selegiline/dextromethorphan.
†An error box would appear in the live system, which should mitigate the risk of not completing the cancelation process, but we were unable to incorporate this error box in our
prototype system; we did not count these instances as errors in our analysis of prescribing errors.
‡Medication changes do not become final in the system until they are signed by a prescriber, and therefore, medications undergoing changes (including discontinuation) are still
reviewed by the alert system.
VA, Veterans Affairs.
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were associated with improved efﬁciency and signiﬁcant reduc-
tions in prescribing errors. This indicates that improved efﬁ-
ciency was not due to prescribers prematurely dismissing the
redesigned alerts.
Satisfaction ratings were generally higher for the redesigned
alerts and were likely due to efforts to reduce text but add more
essential data closer to the point-of-decision. Satisfaction ﬁnd-
ings for ‘interface quality’ are aligned with literature reports on
hazard signs and warning labels that individuals prefer an
outline format (eg, tabular layout) rather than prose, and that
formatting can help individuals easily ﬁnd information.16
Although design changes were favorably received, the ideal
amount of information to present is still unknown. In addition,
ratings for the usefulness of alerts were higher with the redesign
but were not statistically signiﬁcant. With the original alerts, pre-
scribers perceived the design as still ‘useful’ and rated this aspect
higher than the other three satisfaction scores.
Workload
Redesigned alerts resulted in a modest but signiﬁcant reduction
in perceived workload. Neither alert design was particularly
demanding, since global workload scores were below the mid-
point of 50. Prescribers perceived their performance favorably
for both designs, since lower TLX scores indicate more success-
ful performance. Perceptions of performance were not aligned
with results for prescribing errors, since errors were high for the
original alerts but signiﬁcantly reduced with the redesigned
alerts.
Prescribing errors
Three aspects of the redesign likely improved prescribing. First,
redesigns followed human factors principles. This reduced some
prescribing errors, such as those caused by ‘hidden alerts’
(table 3). Second, organizing information into groups can help
maintain an individual’s attention and facilitate information
search and acquisition, a key step that must occur for warning
effectiveness.16 45 The tabular format for redesigned alerts may
have helped prescribers read and encode information, thereby
reducing prescribing errors. Third, redesigned alerts provided
some clinical data closer to the point-of-decision. For example,
details on patients’ previous adverse reactions were readily avail-
able in the mock EHR system for both alert designs, but only
the redesigned alerts displayed adverse reaction details.
Moreover, the mock EHR system did not provide information
on the risks of low creatinine clearance or what speciﬁc medica-
tions to avoid; these details were provided by the redesigned
alerts only. These redesign features are aligned with literature
that underscores the importance of decision support tools that
provide information at the right time and place.46 47
Overall, prescribing errors for both alert designs were higher
than we anticipated. We did not observe any cases where pre-
scribers appeared to click past an alert dialog box without exam-
ining it, and prescribers were asked to ‘think aloud’ when they
encountered alerts; thus, a lack of ‘attention switch’16 (ie, shift-
ing cognitive focus) to the alert dialog box is unlikely to explain
the number of prescribing errors. Even though redesigned alerts
signiﬁcantly reduced prescribing errors, there was no signiﬁcant
difference in how prescribers rated the alert usefulness (table 2)
or their performance (ﬁgure 3) across the two alert designs.
These ﬁndings indicate that subjective feedback from prescribers
is insufﬁcient to evaluate the safety and utility of alert systems in
an accurate manner.
This study has limitations that should be considered when
interpreting results. Prescribers were informed that the patients
were ﬁctitious and may not have always responded to alerts in
the same manner as they would for an actual patient. In add-
ition, our list of pre-deﬁned correct and incorrect actions may
be more conservative than actual clinical practice. Prescribing
errors were lower for the third scenario, and this may be due to
a learning effect and/or this scenario may have been clinically
easier to address. Moreover, in clinical practice, orders are
double-checked by a pharmacist during dispensing to help
prevent errors from reaching the patient, and not all prescribing
errors lead to an adverse event. This study focused on out-
patient care, and ﬁndings may or may not apply to inpatient
care. Prescribers were recruited from a single VAMC, and
although we evaluated alert designs that are used nationally
across the VA, prescribers in other geographic regions may have
responded differently. Nevertheless, we have no evidence
Table 4 Summary of new usability errors that were introduced by the redesigned alerts.
Feature of redesigned alert Usability error Potential reasons why errors occurred Potential safety implications
Increased spacing between
‘Cancel’ and ‘Accept’ action
buttons (figure 2 vs figure 1B)
Two (10%) prescribers vocalized an intention
to proceed with an order, but selected a
‘Cancel’ button on the alert that stopped the
ordering process (figure 2).
Lower right portions of a screen display are
often used for ‘next’ on other software
interfaces, rather than stop or ‘cancel.’
Some orders may be unintentionally canceled,
depending on the layout of action buttons on
alerts. Increased action button spacing in redesign
is NOT recommended (see table 1, row H).
‘Accept’ action button is
disabled until the prescriber
enters required override
justification(s).
Three (15%) prescribers had difficulty
overriding the first redesigned alert that they
encountered and required assistance from
the facilitator.
A disable button design is not used
elsewhere in the EHR. Prescribers may have
interpreted the button to mean that
overriding the alert was not an option.
A disable button design (figure 2) may impede the
processing of medication orders. This design
should not be used on alerts, especially when it
conflicts with the conventions of the EHR interface.
EHR, electronic health record.
Figure 3 Prescribers’ (N=20) perceived workload for the NASA Task
Load Index (TLX) subscales. Results are shown as mean±SEM. For all
subscales, higher scores indicate greater perceived workload. There was
no statistically signiﬁcant difference between the original and
redesigned alerts for any individual subscale.
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suggesting that the ﬁndings would be limited to only one type
of clinical setting or geographic location. Box 1 summarizes key
recommendations based upon study ﬁndings. Finally, although
studies support the use of the tabular format for presenting
warnings,16 this study did not separate the impact of the
tabular format from that of other modiﬁcations in the redesign.
This study was not conducted to speciﬁcally examine the effect
of a singular design feature, rather, the redesigned alerts encom-
passed a set of design changes based upon established human
factors principles (table 1) which, used together, produced the
ﬁndings.
CONCLUSION
Incorporating human factors principles into alert design signiﬁ-
cantly improved usability for prescribers and reduced prescrib-
ing errors. Study ﬁndings suggest that a tabular format for
presenting multiple alerts and grouping similar information
together may aid prescribing decisions. This research also identi-
ﬁed some features, such as scrolling, that pose high patient
safety risks. Many of our ﬁndings are consistent with evidence
from warnings literature, but this study provides some of the
ﬁrst experimental evidence about the presentation of informa-
tion on computerized medication alerts. Results indicate that
even in an environment where prescribers are likely to shift
their cognitive focus from the ordering system to alerts, pre-
scribing errors remained high. This ﬁnding underscores the
need to improve alert interfaces. Ultimately, alert system
Figure 4 (A–C) Frequency of prescribing errors. These include both
errors of omission (no prescription) and errors of commission
(inappropriate prescriptions). (A) Distribution of error frequency across
all scenarios when prescribers used the original versus redesigned
alerts. Prescribers made fewer errors with the redesigned alerts, shifting
the distribution to the left. N=20 prescribers for the original design.
N=18 prescribers for the redesign, since two prescribers did not receive
one of the drug–drug interaction alerts due to technical difﬁculties. (B)
Frequency of prescribing errors across the three patient scenarios (N=18
prescribers for each alert design). (C) Frequency of omission and
commission errors (N=18 prescribers for each alert design). The
majority of errors were errors of commission (and more commission
errors were possible). For (B) and (C), the maximum number of possible
errors for each scenario and error type, respectively, is noted on the
graph. For example, for scenario 1 in ﬁgure 4B, four prescribing errors
were possible with the alerts (4×18 prescribers=72 errors possible). To
allow for direct comparison of the absolute number of errors for (B)
and (C), we excluded all data from two prescribers who did not receive
one of the alerts due to technical difﬁculties; thus, the total possible
errors for these two graphs is 11×18 prescribers=198.
Box 1 Summary of key study recommendations.
▸ To reduce prescribing errors, human factors principles and
warning design guidelines should be systematically
integrated into alert interface designs
▸ A tabular format for alert text may improve efﬁciency,
increase prescribers’ perception of information quality, and
promote better prescribing decisions.
▸ Text on the main alert dialog should not be hidden by
scrolling mechanism(s), since this can be a safety risk. (See
Table 3)
▸ Alerts should undergo formal, systematic usability testing45
to assess the potential for critical usability errors, including
design features that may lead prescribers to cancel or order
a medication unintentionally.
▸ Repeating alerts in the same ordering session for a given
patient case did not substantially reduce prescribing errors.
Design strategies should be implemented to reduce this type
of alert repetition and decrease the risk of alert fatigue.
▸ Mechanisms intended to coordinate care across prescribers
with the original design resulted in repeated alerts and
several usability issues. The redesigned alerts have the
ability to support coordination in some, but not all, cases.
For example, more advanced alerting mechanisms need to
be developed for medications that are “on hold” or in
progress to coordinate care among multiple prescribers. This
is especially important as medication lists become shared
across different healthcare institutions.
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designers should design alert interfaces based on research evi-
dence to promote safety.
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